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Awidely observed phenomenon in decisionmaking under risk is the apparent overweighting of unlikely events and the underweighting
of nearly certain events. This violates standard assumptions in expected utility theory, which requires that expected utility be linear
(objective) in probabilities. Models such as prospect theory have relaxed this assumption and introduced the notion of a “probability
weighting function,” which captures the key properties found in experimental data. This study reports functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) data that neural response to expected reward is nonlinear in probabilities. Specifically, we found that activity in the
striatumduring valuationofmonetary gambles arenonlinear inprobabilities in thepatternpredictedbyprospect theory, suggesting that
probability distortion is reflected at the level of the reward encoding process. The degree of nonlinearity reflected in individual subjects’
decisions is also correlated with striatal activity across subjects. Our results shed light on the neural mechanisms of reward processing,
and have implications for future neuroscientific studies of decisionmaking involving extreme tails of the distribution, where probability
weighting provides an explanation for commonly observed behavioral anomalies.
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Introduction
A central question in the social and biological sciences is how the
likelihood and value of outcomes are combined to make risky
choices. For humans, these choices range widely, from voting, gam-
bling, and buying stocks and insurance to searching for jobs and
mates. The standard approach, expected utility theory (EU), as-
sumes that outcomes x are valued nonlinearly by a utility function
u(x), but areweightedby their objectiveprobabilities (Savage, 1954).
There is substantial evidence in economics and decision-
making research, however, that the hypothesis of expected utility
being linear in probabilities is systematically wrong, in a reliable
direction. This stylized fact was originally established byMaurice
Allais via the “common ratio effect” (Allais, 1953). Consider a
decision maker who prefers a sure ( p 1) gain of $100,000 over
a coin toss ( p  0.5) for $300,000 but who also rejects a 0.02
chance of $100,000 for a 0.01 chance of $300,000. If these choices
are consistent with choosing the gamble with the highest ex-
pected utility, the first choice implies u($100,000) 
0.5u($300,000), while the second choice implies
0.02u($100,000)  0.01u($300,000). The two inequalities are
clearly at odds, since both sides of the second are the same as those
in the first multiplied by 0.02 (Prelec, 1998).
The common ratio pattern can be reconciled by the plausible
assumption that people apply nonlinear “decision weights”( p)
to objective probabilities p, so that the ratio (0.02)/(0.01) is
much smaller than(1)/(0.5) (cf. Rubinstein, 1988). An inverse
S-shaped nonlinear function was first suggested experimentally
(Preston andBaratta, 1948), is a central feature of prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), and has been replicated in sub-
sequent experimental and field studies including ours (see Fig.
1A,B and supplemental material, available at www.jneurosci.
org). Small probabilities are typically overweighted while high
probabilities are underweighted, with a crossover point, at which
a probability is subjectivelyweighted by its objective value of p*
( p*) around 1/3 (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kagel et al.,
1995; Prelec, 1998; Starmer, 2000).
Despite its clear relevance in a wide variety of settings, few
studies have directly studied nonlinearweighting of probabilities,
especially compared with the number of studies on risk and re-
ward as a whole. There is much evidence that a number of brain
regions are sensitive to expected reward (or “utility”). Arguably
the most well established are dopaminergic regions such as the
striatum and midbrain structures (Knutson et al., 2001; Abler et
al., 2006; Tobler et al., 2007). However, most studies do not sam-
ple sufficiently near the probability endpoints to detect the theo-
retical nonlinearity. The two existing studies on probability
weighting also have not shown neural responses to probabilities
resembling the smoothly increasing function which typically fit
behavior well. Paulus and Frank (2006) focused on between-
subjects measures and found that activity in anterior cingulate
correlated with degree of nonlinearity across subjects. Berns et al.
(2008) used probabilities of shock and found a number of regions
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exhibiting flat responses to probability,
but were not able to statistically reject the
null linear hypothesis. In this study, we
used a parametric design that varied the
probabilities and outcome of two gambles
in a binary choice task.Our statistical anal-
ysis focused on separating the weighted
form of expected utility into two compo-
nents: a portion linear in probabilities, and
one that is nonlinear in probabilities. The
null hypothesis of EU predicts only signifi-
cant responses to the linear portion. Under
the alternative hypothesis of nonlinear
weighting, we expect to find regions corre-
latedwithboth the linear andnonlinear por-
tions inamannerpredictedbyexistingmod-
els of probability weighting.
Materials andMethods
The experimental sample was 21 subjects (11
female). Their mean (SD) age was 29.6 (7.5).
Informed consentwas given through a form ap-
proved by the Internal ReviewBoard at Caltech.
Subjects were recruited from an online bulletin
board (see supplemental material, available at
www.jneurosci.org).
Experimental paradigm
The experiment consisted of 120 self-paced tri-
als (Fig. 2). In each trial, subjects chose between
two simple gambles, ( p1, x1) and ( p2, x2). A
gamble pays off $x with probability p and $0
otherwise. Subjects were first presented a screen
containing only ( p1, x1). This serves to isolate
the brain response evaluating ( p1, x1) without
confounding evaluation of the second gamble
( p2, x2) or the process of choice. The values of
p1 are {0.01, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.8, 0.95}, the values of
$x are {10, 20, 50, 100}, and they are combined
factorially to form 24 pairs, which are each pre-
sented five times.
On 12 randomly chosen trials (10% of the
trials), subjects were asked after the first-
gamble presentation to indicate whether p1 
0.4. This was done to ensure that subjects were
paying attention to the first-gamble stimulus.
The final screen presented both the first gamble
and a second gamble, and subjects chose one of
the gambles. The probability and reward levels
of the second gamble, ( p2, x2), were varied
across trials, and were chosen so that its
weighted expected utility (see model below)
would be close to that of the first gamble, which
facilitated powerful behavioral estimation of
the relevant parameters of the experiment. At
the end of the experiment, one choice round
was randomly selected and the gamble chosen
in that round was resolved to determine the
subject’s payment. Average earnings for sub-
jects were $21.48 $5.49 plus the participation
fee of $20 (for more detail, see supplemental
Methods, available at www.jneurosci.org as
supplemental material).
Behavioral analysis
A stochastic choice model was used to infer the
probability weighting function from behavior
and correlate its parametric expression with
Figure1. Nonlinearweightingof probability inferred fromchoices.A, Fits of theweighting function( p) frommanyprevious
behavioral studies (see supplementalmaterial, available atwww.jneurosci.org as supplementalmaterial).B, Fits from individual
subjects in our experiment using the one-parameter Prelec weighting function (with( p) p at p 1/e). C, Fits from various
weighting functions (supplemental Table S2, available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material) using group-level pa-
rameters from our experiment (blue: Prelec 1-parameter; red: Prelec 2-parameter; yellow: Kahneman and Tversky; cyan: Latti-
more; green: Wu and Gonzalez).
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Figure 2. The experimental sequence of events. (1) A single gamble, consisting of the probability p1 of receiving some dollar
amount $x1 (or 0 otherwise). (2) In 12 of the 120 trials, subjects are then asked to indicatewhether the probability in the previous
screen was greater or less than 40/100 (to engage attention to screen 1). (3) Subjects see a choice screen showing the gamble
shown in 1 and a new gamble.
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brain activity (see supplemental Methods, available at www.jneurosci.
org as supplementalmaterial). As inmany studies on this topic, precision
is gained by assuming specific functional forms for the utility and prob-
ability weighting functions. The utility function is assumed to be a power
function u(x;) x , and the probability weighting function is the one-
parameter Prelec weighting function ( p;)  1/exp{{ln(1/p)}} (Pr-
elec, 1998), derived axiomatically from psychophysical principles [it is
implied if ln(1/( p)) is a power function of ln(1/p)]. Decision weights
and utilities are assumed to be combined linearly,U(x, p)( p, )u(x,
) (where the zero payoff has zero utility). We chose the one-parameter
Prelec function because it fits as well as or better than other one- and two-
parameter functions that were estimated from subjects’ choices (Table 1),
and having one parameter simplifies the cross-subject analysis below.
fMRI acquisition
Scans were acquired using the 3 Tesla Siemens Trio scanner at Caltech’s
Broad Imaging Center. Anatomical images (high-resolution, T1-
weighted) were acquired first. Functional (T2-weighted) images were
then acquired using the following parameters: TR  2000 ms, TE  40
ms, slice thickness  4 mm, 32 slices. Horizontal slices were acquired
30° clockwise of the anterior–posterior commissure (AC–PC) axis to
minimize signal dropout of the orbitofrontal cortex. The total time du-
ration of the experiment varied because each round was self-paced.
fMRI analysis
Imaging data were preprocessed using SPM2, including, in order, slice
time correction, motion correction, coregistration, normalization to the
MNI template, and smoothing of the functional data with an 8 mm
kernel (Friston et al., 1995). Random effects analyses were done in SPM2
(Friston et al., 1995) by specifying a separate general linear model for
each subject and pooling at the second level. First all images were high-
pass filtered in the temporal domain (filter width 128 s) and autocorre-
lation of the hemodynamic responses was modeled as an AR(1) process.
In the GLMmodel all visual stimuli andmotor responses were entered as
separate regressors that were constructed by convolving a hemodynamic
response function (hrf) with a comb of Dirac functions at the onset of
each visual stimulus or motor response. Parametric modulators were
added to the main regressors as interaction terms.
Parametric model. An event-related analysis focused on brain activity
during presentation of the first gamble. Because no information is
present regarding the second gamble, we assume brain regions correlated
with decision variables reflect reward anticipation with respect to first
gamble, rather than choice. We further make the assumption that neural
activity is approximately a linear function of the behaviorally derived
utility function (that is, we search for brain activity which resembles closely
the functions in Fig. 1A,B). A GLM is used that separates the weighting
function into two components: (1) component that is linear in p and (2) the
component that is the nonlinear deviation term ( p, i)  ( p, i)  p
(Fig. 3A). Specifically, we are looking for a prospect-theoretic expected value
function that is nonlinear in p; that is, ( p, )u(x) p  u(x) ( p, ) 
u(x).We assume the functionu(x) is a power function x, where the value of
 is taken fromthe individual behavioral estimate, and( p,)( p,)
p, where the mean group  0.771 is used.
The BOLD signal during the first gamble presentation is regressed
against p  u(x) and ( p, )  u(x). If the expected utility (EU) null
hypothesis is an accurate approximation of valuation of risky choices,
there should be no reward-related brain regions that respond to the
deviation term( p,)  u(x). If the nonlinear weighting hypothesis is an
accurate approximation, there should be reward-related brain regions
that respond equally strongly to the linear component p  u(x) and to the
nonlinear component ( p, )  u(x).
Nonparametric model. To see how closely activity in brain regions
correlated with the weighting function corresponds to the behaviorally
derived stylized empirical weighting function, a nonparametric method
was used. Each level of probability pwas given a separate dummy variable
I( p). The relation y  i  Ii( p)  u(x)  was estimated, where y is
the BOLD response upon presentation of the first gamble, I is an indica-
tor function for the particular level of p, and u(x) is a power function x 
used above. Each i for the six levels of probability was then rescaled by
dividing thei values for each probability level by the estimated slope for
the response to the linear probability term in the parametric regression of
activity against the linear and deviation terms. This is to take into account
the dimensionless nature of BOLD responses as well as to add a robust-
ness check of the concordance of the relationship between the parametric
and nonparametric model.
Between-subject correlation. Next we test whether cross-subject varia-
tion in the inflection of nonlinear weighting inferred from choices is
consistent with cross-subject differences in neural activity. Intuitively,
more highly nonlinear functions will be approximated by a combination
of the linear term p and the nonlinear term ( p, i)  ( p, i)  p
(shown in Fig. 3A, right) that puts more weight on the nonlinear term.
Less nonlinear functions will put less weight on the nonlinear term. A
linear-weighting subject, for example, will put no weight on the nonlin-
ear deviation ( p, i) ( p, i) p. This analysis exploits the helpful
fact that in the one-parameter Prelec form, all functions ( p, i) pass
through a common value(1/e) 0.Weighting functions with 0.77
(less inflected, more linear) will therefore be well approximated by p plus
a dampened form of the deviation curve in Figure 3A (right). Weighting
functions with  0.77 (more inflected) will be approximated by p plus
an amplified form of the decision curve in Figure 3A.
Denote the true weighting function for subject i by ( p, i), and the
deviations from linear weighting by ( p, i)  ( p, i)  p. A brain
region that represents ( p, i) will be significantly correlated with both
( p, i) and p. Using the mean inflection parameter   0.77, the
theoretical relation is ( p, )  a  b1  p  b2  ( p,  )  e [that is,
every weight  gives a weighting function that, when its values are re-
gressed against p and( p, ), gives weights b1 and b2]. Fig. 4A shows the
value of b2 that is theoretically estimated for the various values of 
inferred from subjects’ choices. The value of b2 is the inflection sensitivity
(comparedwith the benchmark groupmean 0.77) for particular values
of subject-specific . Note that when   (a person’s  equals the group
mean), b21, andwhen 1 (a linearweighting function), b2 0 because
the nonlinear deviation term receives no weight. The graph shows that in
theory, lower individual values of, corresponding tomore inflection of the
weighting function, should lead to higher values of the b2 coefficient. That is,
more inflected functions are best approximated by a combination of the
linear term p and nonlinear deviation term (calculated using the average  )
with a higher weight on the nonlinear deviation term.
Results
Behavioral results
Table 1 contains the pooled (grouped-subject) estimates of the
various weighting function parameters as well as the utility func-
tion power parameter  and the stochastic choice response sen-
sitivity . Five subjects always chose the gamble with the higher
probability, such that their choices did not permit identification
of the relevant parameters. These subjects were therefore ex-
Table 1. Pooled estimates (SEs) of various weighting functions defined in supplemental Table S1 (available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material)
LL  1 2 
Prelec 1 (1 ) 1493.4 0.499 (0.0160) 0.724 (0.0235) 1.464 (0.0911)
Prelec 2 (1 , 2 ) 1491.1 0.441 (0.0307) 0.708 (0.0222) 0.859 (0.0619) 1.972 (0.2908)
Kahneman and Tversky (1 ) 1505.1 0.494 (0.0161) 0.774 (0.0215) 1.386 (0.0819)
Lattimore (1 , 2 	) 1502.3 0.531 (0.0264) 0.786 (0.0368) 0.795 (0.0592) 1.166 (0.1326)
Wu and Gonzalez (1 , 2 ) 1504.0 0.525 (0.0274) 0.850 (0.0595) 2.023 (0.7828) 1.191 (0.1446)
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cluded from this and all subsequent fMRI
analyses that depended on these parameter
estimates. Figure 1C plots the estimated
functional forms for all five functions and
shows that they look similar (except for
more pronounced overweighting of low
probabilities in the Prelec two-parameter
form). The two Prelec functions fit slightly
better than the others as judged by lower
negative log likelihood LL. We focused on
the one-parameter version of the Prelec
function, as it fits only slightly worse than
the two-parameter version, and permits
simpler cross-subject comparison (since
each subject’s curvature is expressed by
one parameter rather than two).
Supplemental Table S4 (available at
www.jneurosci.org as supplemental mate-
rial) presents individual parameter esti-
mates for the stochastic choice model.
These parameter estimates are similar to
those found in the literature, indicating
nonlinear weighting of probability
(mean  0.77 0.08) and concavity of
utility for money (  0.57  0.04) (see
supplemental material, available at
www.jneurosci.org). These estimates
also correspond closely to pooled esti-
mates shown in Table 1.
fMRI results
We first identify regions that are signifi-
cantly correlated with the linear term of
the parametric model (Table 2). Consis-
tent with previous literature, we found a
number of regions including striatum
(Knutson et al., 2001; Abler et al., 2006;
Preuschoff et al., 2006; Tobler et al., 2007),
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Knutson
et al., 2001), and cerebellum (Knutson et
al., 2001), as well as frontal regions such as
motor areas and medial prefrontal cortex
(Knutson et al., 2001; Yacubian et al.,
2006; Tobler et al., 2007). Regions that are
significantly correlated with the nonlinear
term include the striatum, cingulate gyrus,
motor cortex, and cerebellum (Table 3).
Significant activation in the striatum and
cingulate gyrus are in particular consistent
with findings from two previous papers on
probabilityweighting (Paulus andFrank, 2006;Berns et al., 2008). In
contrast, there are no regions where activity was negatively corre-
lated with the nonlinear term at traditional significance levels ( p
0.1) (for details, see Table S6, available at www.jneurosci.org as sup-
plemental material).
Next we search for regions that are significantly and equally
activated by both the linear term and the nonlinear term. These
regions include the striatum (Fig. 3B; supplemental Figs. S2, S3,
available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material), motor
cortex, and cerebellum.We focus on the striatum for two reasons.
First, it is well established to be involved in reward processing and
specifically in reward anticipation (Knutson et al., 2000; Schultz,
2000; O’Doherty et al., 2004). In particular it has been suggested
that the striatum combines reward magnitude and probability
multiplicatively into a general expected reward signal (Tobler et
al., 2007). Second, in our data, the striatum is correlated with
both the linear term and the nonlinear term (Fig. 3B).We cannot
reject the hypothesis of equal response to both terms at highly
liberal p values (i.e., we can conclude with high confidence that
the activity levels are not different). Furthermore, this result is
robust to two variations of the statistical model that we used (see
supplemental Figs. S3, S4, available at www.jneurosci.org as sup-
plemental material).
Figure 3C contains results from the nonparametric model,
where the neuralnormalized by the groupmean for each level
of probability used in the experiment are plotted against the true
Figure 3. A, The analysis decomposes expected reward responses into two terms, the linear component in p (left, dashed line)
and the nonlinear( p) p component (right). B, Glass brain and coronal section of activations to both linear p and nonlinear
( p) p 0.77. Red, Regions where both linear and nonlinear terms are activated at p 0.001, excluding regions where
linear and nonlinear terms are significantly different at p 0.9; Yellow, Regionswhere both linear term is activated at p 0.001
and nonlinear term at p 0.005, excluding regions where linear and nonlinear terms are significantly different at p 0.5. For
additional coronal sections, see supplemental Figure S2 (available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material). C, Normal-
ized GLM  coefficients of BOLD signal activation for extracted voxels (blue dots) in the left and right striatum coronal section
shown in B (yellow) and Prelec function with group behavioral parameter ( 0.77) inferred from choices (solid black line).
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probabilities, as well as a plot of the behaviorally inferred weight-
ing function using the group  0.77. To adjust the raw proba-
bility weight values (which range from0 to 1) to scale comparably
to the neural , the behavioral weights were regressed against the
neural  for each probability. The behavioral weights were then
multiplied by the regression slope, and the regression constant
was added, to create the adjusted values plotted in Figure 3C.
There is a clear concavity in low-probability activity and convex-
ity in high-probability activity, and relatively equal activity for
probabilities from 0.10 to 0.80, which are also the key features of
the psychometric curves derived frombehavior. The neurometri-
cally derived BOLD signal curve looks like a more inflected ex-
pression of the psychometric curve. In particular, the behavioral
weighting function departs from the objective probabilities more
so than the I( p) neural estimates. Finally, a non-nested model
test (Cox test) rejects the linear model in favor of the nonlinear
( p) ( p 0.064) and does not reject the linearmodel against the
( p) alternative ( p 0.302) (see supplemental Methods, avail-
able at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material). That is, the
( p)model contains additional explanatory power relative to the
linear model, whereas the reverse is not true. This, however, cannot
rule out other models that we have not considered, nor potential
confounds that may influence the BOLD response to anticipated
reward. Indeed, introspectionof Figure 3C shows that there remains
much variation between the neurometric and psychometric curves
that are not explained by our model; the highly imperfect fit could
surely be improved by other designs andmodels. Future studies will
therefore be needed to explore this important issue.
Cross-subject correlation
Figure 3B presents the regions of striatumwith activity during the
first gamble presentation that is significantly correlated with the
linear component p and the nonlinear component( p,) and in
which the empirical coefficient on the nonlinear component (b2)
is negatively correlated with subject . The values of the nonlin-
ear component weight b2 for each subject is plotted against that
subject’s behaviorally estimated  in Figure 4B. Across subjects,
those with more inflected decision weights as revealed by the
behavioral stochastic choice function (lower ) do have higher
values of b2 estimated from neural activity (r  0.35, boot-
strapped 95% confidence interval (0.60,0.05)) The scaling of
the coefficients is arbitrary (since it is derived from BOLD signal)
but the sign of the coefficients is consistent with the theoretical
relationship in Figure 4A. Subjects with positive b2 coefficients
are generally those with inverse S-shaped weighting functions
( 1), who overestimate small probabilities and underestimate
large ones. The two subjects with negative
b2 coefficients have   1 and underesti-
mate small probabilities and overestimate
large ones [i.e., they act as if they have neg-
ative rather than positive weight on the
nonlinear deviation term shown in Fig. 3A
(right)]. Excluding the two subjects with
 1 from the Figure 4B analysis reduces
the correlation coefficient only slightly, to
r0.34 [bootstrap 95% confidence in-
terval (0.92, 0.17)].
Discussion
The hypothesis that organisms weight
probabilities objectively (i.e., linearly)
when evaluating risks has been a useful
benchmark in many areas of social and bi-
ological sciences and is a reasonable ap-
proximation for many risks (Kagel et al., 1995). However, much
of the appeal of the linear-weighting EU model comes from its
empirical superiority to the simpler expected valuemodel [where
u(x) x] and the intuitive appeal of its logical axioms.
There is much behavioral evidence, however, that linearity
appears to break down for very high and low probabilities in a
systematic manner (Allais, 1953; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
Indeed, OskarMorgenstern, one of the founders of expected util-
ity theory, speculated that linearity is a plausible assumption
within the intermediate range of probabilities because “a normal
individual would have some intuition of what 50:50 or 25:75
means,” but that linearity at extreme probabilities was unlikely
because “probabilities used must be within certain plausible
ranges and not go to 0.01 or even less to 0.001” (Morgenstern,
1979, p. 178). Allowing for such nonlinearity elegantly reconciles
the common phenomenon of simultaneously purchasing insur-
ance against rare disasters (a risk-averse choice) and buying lot-
tery tickets (a risk-seeking choice) because both are consistent
with overweighting low probabilities.
The linearity hypothesis has also been adopted, often implic-
itly, in most studies of decision making and learning in neuro-
science (Yacubian et al., 2006). For example, in standard models
of reinforcement learning, reward prediction is assumed to result
from an unbiased representation of rewards accumulated from
experience (Montague et al., 2004). Therefore, reward predic-
tions in stochastic environments are expected to be accurate in
the long run. Most existing studies have not sampled closely
enough to probability endpoints to be sensitive to the full pattern
of predicted nonlinearity. For example, in the study byAbler et al.
(2006), the probabilities sampled were {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}, for
money rewards. Berns et al. (2008) used probabilities {1/6, 2/6,
4/6, 5/6, 1} for electric shocks. Given existing evidence that the
inflection point is1/3, one would expect to find a closely linear
approximation across the range of probabilities in the former
studies, rather than the full reverse S-shaped function. Similarly,
one would expect a convex function in the study by Berns et al.
(2008) with disproportionate brain responses to the lowest prob-
ability of 1/6. This is consistent with their results, which found a
U-shaped response in the caudate/subgenual anterior cingulate
cortex. This region of activation is further anterior compared
with our striatal activation, and is negatively correlated with the
magnitude of shock. This potentially reflects differences between
encoding of rewards in the gain and loss domain.
In addition, in many neuroscientific studies of decision mak-
ing, probabilities are estimated, either from ratios of bars and pie
Figure 4. A, Theoretical coefficient on nonlinear probability component ( p) p as a function of individual nonlinearity
parameteri. B, Scatter plot of within-subject empirical response ( coefficient from GLM) in average of left and right striatum and
individual-subject nonlinearity parameteri. The negative correlation is consistentwith the theoretical relationship shown inA.
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areas (Huettel et al., 2006; Berns et al., 2008) or from past expe-
rience in studies of learning (O’Doherty et al., 2004; Haruno and
Kawato, 2006). This methodology differs from those in the be-
havioral literature on probability weighting, where the probabil-
ities are usually given explicitly in numerical format (and some-
times graphically as well) (Camerer and Ho, 1994; Wu and
Gonzalez, 1996; Kilka, 2001). Using devices such as pies or bars to
depict probabilities without numerical representations can po-
tentially induce difficulties in interpretation of the source of
probability weighting. There is substantial evidence that individ-
uals make systematic errors in proportion estimation, especially
for proportions close to zero or one (Varey et al., 1990; Hollands
and Dyre, 2000). Therefore it becomes unclear whether the be-
havioral patterns come from errors in estimating probabilities
from graphical displays, or from nonlinearity in the valuation
process.
In this study, therefore, we closely followed the representation
of decisions under risk used in the behavioral economics litera-
ture, while at the same time take into account of the limitations of
neuroimaging measures by separating presentation of the gam-
bles in time. This allowed us to dissociate neural contributions of
the evaluation of individual gambles from activity due to com-
parison and choice (Fig. 2). The need for temporal separation of
evaluation and choice does not arise in behavioral studies in
which the only observable variable is choice. Existing studies do
not always distinguish between perception of value and the deci-
sion process (Paulus and Frank, 2006). This distinction, however,
is of potential importance when using neuroimaging data. The
modeling of probability weighting assumes that the value function
itself is “distorted” (nonlinear) in probabilities, whereas the decision
process is unbiased. The temporal separation therefore allows us to
focus on reward perception, rather than simultaneous perception
Table 2. Regions significantly correlated with probability (p) term
MNI coordinates
Voxels (k) Cluster punc t value Voxel punc x y z Region
159 0.003 5.39 0 12 15 60 Motor cortex
5.18 0 15 9 48
19 0.236 4.89 0 12 3 6 Striatum
78 0.025 4.76 0 30 51 27 Culmen
12 0.345 4.63 0 9 57 24 Superior frontal gyrus
29 0.147 4.48 0 12 0 3 Globus pallidus
14 0.307 4.44 0 30 87 9 Inferior occipital gyrus
22 0.203 4.4 0 6 24 12 Brodmann 25
26 0.168 4.28 0 15 48 24 Posterior cingulate gyrus
3.78 0.001 24 48 27
41 0.089 4.25 0 9 75 24 Cerebellum
4.03 0 9 66 27
17 0.261 4.23 0 42 9 21 Inferior frontal gyrus
15 0.291 4.14 0 51 18 24 IFG
28 0.154 4.04 0 18 21 18 ACC
3.89 0.001 27 24 18
11 0.366 4.03 0 21 45 15 Brodmann 31
3.81 0.001 18 48 24
19 0.236 3.96 0 18 6 3 Striatum
3.95 0 24 6 12
3.67 0.001 27 3 9
13 0.325 3.85 0.001 33 9 9
18 0.248 3.85 0.001 9 9 3 Insula/putamen
3.82 0.001 21 18 12
3.75 0.001 18 18 3
Activations are thresholded at p 0.001 and cluster size k 10. Coordinates are in MNI space.
Table 3. Regions significantly correlated with nonlinear deviation term (p)
MNI coordinates
Voxels (k) Cluster punc t value Voxel punc x y z Region
169 0 5.4 0 33 3 24 Brodmann 9/cingulate
4.65 0 15 24 30
4.33 0 27 18 30
65 0.007 5.06 0 3 3 0 Striatum
4.84 0 0 6 9
4.58 0 0 15 3
22 0.091 4.89 0 18 21 39 Brodmann 31
15 0.156 4.52 0 18 72 33 Cerebellum
21 0.098 4.43 0 12 12 21 Cingulate
19 0.114 4.27 0 24 9 18 Striatum
28 0.06 4.14 0 30 9 39 Middle frontal gyrus
3.96 0 30 6 39
19 0.114 4.14 0 15 3 48 Brodmann 24
17 0.133 4.06 0 24 27 48 Middle frontal gyrus
3.86 0.001 18 36 48 Brodmann 8
Activations are thresholded at p 0.001 and cluster size k 10. Coordinates are in MNI space.
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and choice (Preuschoff et al., 2006). Our fMRI results suggest that
striatumactivity in evaluation of risks is nonlinear in probabilities in
isolation of choice, consistent with standard interpretations of the
weighting function. Activity in the striatum is also found by Tom et
al. (2007) in response to gamblemonetary values, and canbeused to
link the neural aversion to loss (compared with equal-sized gain) to
behavioral loss-aversion.
More generally, this type of study represents an empirical
competition betweenmodels of risky choices which are rooted in
logical axioms (chiefly the independence axiom stated earlier)
and models rooted in psychophysics which can be further
grounded in evolutionary adaptation. This study completes the
exploratory studies to the key elements of prospect theory, the
others being loss aversion (Tom et al., 2007) and framing/refer-
ence point (De Martino et al., 2006) (for review, see Fox and
Poldrack, 2008). Our intuition is that brain activity during valu-
ation of risks is more likely to correspond to the cognitive com-
ponents of prospect theory than to EU, and it will also be easier to
construct an adaptationist account of how evolution would have
shaped brains to follow prospect theory rather than EU (Robson,
2002), since prospect theory follows from psychophysics and EU
from normative logic. Establishing a neural and evolutionary ba-
sis of prospect theory could provide an illustrative example of
how the foundation for principles guiding social sciencemight be
usefully shifted from relying largely on logic, to respecting bio-
logical implementation (which might, of course, include conver-
gence to logical principles as a result of learning or higher-order
cognition).
There are a number of more general implications for neuro-
scientific studies of reward and decisionmaking. Thematuration
of decision neuroscience and neuroeconomics will likely lead to
increasing emphasis on problems involving extreme tails of the
distribution (e.g., public fear about rare catastrophic risks, patho-
logical gambling, broad participation in long-tailed lotteries, and
preferences for financial assets with positive skewness) (Barberis
and Huang, 2008). The numerical ratio of overweighting of low
probabilities is dramatic for the functions we estimate: probabil-
ities of 102, 106, and 109 are overweighed by factors of 4, 520,
and 33,000, respectively.
In addition, some studies suggest that probabilities learned
through experience do not exhibit the same type of patterns of
behavior as those represented abstractly (Hertwig et al., 2004; Fox
and Hadar, 2006). Furthermore, because the learning process is
still under investigation, it is unknown how the brain updates
probabilities conditional on past events.More studies of the neu-
ral basis of response to probabilities represented abstractly, and
those learned from experience, are therefore needed to provide a
unified framework to understand and reconcile these results.
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